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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

D]CLARATORY JUDGMxNT-DxCLARING RIGHTS UNDXR THn
Guisn or GRANT-

ING AN INJUNCTION-It has often been held that a party may obtain a judicial
determination of his rights in respect to legislation alleged to be invalid,
by
means of an application to a court of equity for an injunction restraining
the
enforcement of the statute. Ex parte Young (1907) 209 U. S. 123,
is the
leading case of this type. There, a railroad rate statute was involved,
which
required compliance by all railroad companies in the state, under the
threat
of heavy penalties. The railroad actually violated the provisions of
the
statute after an injunction had been obtained by a stockholder restraining
the company from complying, and prosecution for the violation was prevented
by an injunction against the attorney general. The latter injunction, it
must
be noted, was an effective and appropriate order, because acts of violation
were in fact taking place which would otherwise have called forth action
by
the attorney general. The injunction could not, therefore, be looked upon
as
anything but a genuinely operative remedy. Truax v. Raich (1915) 239
U. S.
33, Michigan Salt Works v. Baird (i913) 173 Mich. 655, and other like
cases,
were all similar in this respect. In each, the act for which the prosecution
was feared had been committed, and the injunction was employed as a
protection against a presently possible prosecution.
But let it be supposed that the case is one where no violation of the
statute has taken place and where none is contemplated until after the
court
has passed upon its validity. Is there anything to enjoin? The attorney
general cannot prosecute because nothing has been done upon which to
base a
prosecution. Can the attorney general be enjoined from prosecuting before
any violation or even threat of violation has occurred?
In Anway v. Grand Rapids, Ry. Co. (192o) 211 Mich. 592, an effort was
made to obtain a decision from the court as to whether a contract could
legally be made which the plaintiff alleged that he was desirous of making.
The plaintiff feared the penalties of a statute. He had no intention of
entering into the proposed contract unless he was first assured by the court that
he
would not be liable for the penalty. He asked for a declaration of
rights,
under the Declaratory Judgment Act, and got it, but the supreme court
held
that at this stage there was no controversy pending, and that the declaration
was only a decision on a moot question and therefore invalid. Apparently
it
was the view of the supreme court of Michigan that until the plaintiff
did
some act upon which the penal statute could operate, there could be no judicial question. In this view of the proceedings the addition of a prayer for
an
injunction against the attorney general would have added nothing to
the
substance of the case, for no prosecution was possible because there was
no
violation of the statute, either actual or threatened. The infirmity
in the
case was held to go much deeper than a mere procedural failure to
add a
suitable prayer. The court held that there was no cause of action in existence
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which could be employed by the plaintiff in a court of justice.
A case identical on its facts with the Anway Case has just been decided
by the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington,
three judges sitting and concurring. Terrace v. Tlompson (1921) 274 Fed.
841. In that case the owners of certain land wished to lease it to a Japanese.
A statute known as the Alien Land Bill in terms prohibited such a lease under
heavy penalties, but the parties believed the apparent prohibition was not
legally effective. They were not willing, however, to make the lease unless
the court first assured them that it could safely be done, and they joined as
complainants in a bill in equity, making the attorney general a party defendant, and-asked for an injunction restraining the defendant from prosecuting
under the statute. The court cited Ex parte Young, supra, as authority for
taking jurisdiction, and the rights of the parties were determined. As in the
Altway Case, no act had been done by the complainants contrary to the statute.
No prosecution was therefore possible, and the complainants made it clear
in their bill that they did not propose to render themselves liable to any
prosecution. The attorney general was therefore enjoined from an impossibility, viz., from suing on a cause of action which not only did not exist but
was not threatened or even contemplated. The injunction was therefore
essentially premature, and apparently served only as a cloak to hide a mere
declaration of rights. The court held that where parties contemplate entering into a contract which may or may not amount to a violation of a penal
statute, the court will, in advance of any act on their part which could be
deemed wrongful, pass upon their rights and tell them whether their contemplated action will or will not be a violation of the act. This is a pure
declaration of rights, and it was made in this case as an exercise of inherent
judicial power, without any authorizing statute.
R. R. S.

